A meme is spreading that argues the current moment parallels a "medieval period" that is variously and often roughly defined. I did so here, discussing Toronto's G20, and here about "medieval modernity" and post-city urbanism.
On December 28, in the Financial Times, Parag Khanna wrote that "the world we are moving into in 2011 is one not just with many more prominent nations, but one with numerous centres of power in other ways. It is, in short, a neo-medieval world." This world, he writes, very much resembles the 12th century.
Now, globalisation is again doing much the same, diffusing power away from the west in particular, but also from states and towards cities, companies, religious groups, humanitarian non-governmental organisations and super-empowered individuals, from terrorists to philanthropists. This force of entropy will not be reversed for decades – if not for centuries. As was the case a millennium ago, diplomacy now takes place among anyone who is someone; its prerequisite is not sovereignty but authority.
Some see contrary trends in the light of the financial crisis. But given the power of the forces pushing a new medievalism, it is too simple to speak of a “return of the state” evident in the bail-out of Wall Street and the stimulus packages of governments. Far more revealing about the future is the crumbling of most of the post-colonial world from Africa to the Middle East to South Asia, where over-population, corrupt governance, ethnic grievances and collapsing infrastructure are pushing many states towards failure.
Khanna's article covers a lot of topics for a few hundred words and is a bit of a hodgepodge of ideas and events. As one example, he labels a "hybrid public-private system of governance" and uses Afghanistan as an example, forecasting a "postmodern arrangement between international extractive companies, the Kabul government, local warlords and foreign peacekeepers."
Other interesting claims include parallels between the provision of public services by powerful families, including a comparison of the Tatas and Ambanis in India with the House of Medici, and the rise of Islamic political philanthropy, like Hizbollah, doing much the same. As the analogy concerns America, which had no role to play in the Middle Ages, the author suggests the EU plays the role of the Holy Roman Empire and the US is a new Byzantium, "facing both east and west while in a state of relative decline." All are barely touched on in this piece, but interesting enough for me to set up a new Google Alert for him.
Cheryl Rofer critically responds to the article, noting some problems with the timing of events and claims toward decentralization. She moves through a long discussion of state accretion during the period and gets more specific about the differences between the 12th and 13th centuries.
She sums up those centuries with as being about "the human urge toward autonomy and the violent response from the powers that be, and the effects of occupations." That phrase could well apply to our own time, but she notes important differences. The status of the United States differs substantially from that of Byzantium, if only in the massively disproportionate spending on what she calls "defence" (more aptly, weapons, offensive wars, and defensive control and surveillance) by the current imperial power.
